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Estimating the Effect of Mortgage Foreclosures on  
Nearby Property Values: A Critical Review of the Literature
W. Scott Frame*
In response to the wave of residential mortgage foreclosures in the past few 
years, federal, state and local government intervention programs have aimed to 
reduce the presumed social costs of foreclosures. Before the recent crisis, there 
was little economic research documenting foreclosure spillover effects.
This article takes a critical look at the recent literature that seeks to 
estimate the negative effects of residential mortgage foreclosures. This review 
suggests that foreclosed properties sell at a discount, likely because such 
properties are in worse condition than surrounding properties. What’s more, 
very nearby foreclosures appear to depress the sales prices of nondistressed 
properties, but this effect diminishes rapidly over physical distance and time. 
The author suggests that the considerable variation in foreclosure discount 
and spillover estimates that occurs from study to study may be related to data 
limitations (specific places and times) and poorly specified empirical models in 
some studies. He notes that studies using a repeat-sales approach seem to hold 
greater promise than those using hedonic regressions; the former approach is 
more likely to hold property and neighborhood characteristics constant and 
make it easier to examine multiple geographies and longer time periods.
JEL classification: G21, G28
Key words: residential mortgages, foreclosures, foreclosure spillovers, negative 
externalities
*The author is a financial economist and policy adviser in the Atlanta Fed’s research 
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1
T
he United States has experienced a tremendous wave of residential mortgage foreclosures in 
recent years.1 Based on data from the Mortgage Bankers Association, as of year-end 2006, just 
over a half million residential mortgages were in foreclosure, representing 1.2 percent of all such 
loans. Just three years later, as of year-end 2009, more than two million residential mortgages were 
being foreclosed upon, or 4.6 percent of all such loans. 
In  response  to  these  developments,  federal,  state,  and  local  governments  have  created 
programs aimed at keeping families in their homes and/or reducing the increased stock of vacant 
homes. Two prominent examples are the U.S. Treasury’s Home Affordable Modification Program 
(HAMP) and Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) grants distributed to states and some 
local governments through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Such 
policy interventions may be justified on economic efficiency grounds if there are either (1) frictions 
preventing efficient renegotiations between lenders and delinquent borrowers or (2) social costs, 
or externalities, associated with foreclosures.
Recent papers by Cordell et al. (2009) and Gerardi and Li (2010) discuss potential barriers 
to efficient renegotiation of residential mortgages. By contrast, this article provides a critical 
review of the literature seeking to estimate foreclosure externalities. The article first provides 
some background information about the recent foreclosure wave and the associated public sector 
response.  The  discussion  then  summarizes  the  literature  on  “foreclosure  discounts,”  which 
presumably must exist for foreclosures to have negative price effects on nearby properties. 
Next, I synthesize the empirical evidence measuring the effect of foreclosure on nearby property 
sales prices. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the existence of social costs related to 
foreclosure activity although the study identifies various methodological issues, data limitations, 
and curious results. 
Background
U.S. mortgage foreclosures began to rise in late 2006 at the same time that national house prices 
began to fall.2 Figure 1 presents quarterly data on the percent of mortgages entering foreclosure 
(flow) and in the process of foreclosure (stock) for 2000 through 2009. While both foreclosure 
measures  have  markedly  increased,  the  series  have  diverged  in  recent  quarters  because  of 
expanding foreclosure timelines. Figure 2 illustrates temporal variation in house prices over the 
same 2000–9 period as measured by two popular indices—the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA) and S&P/Case-Shiller. The latter series, which is clearly more volatile, having peaked 
higher and fallen farther, suggests that U.S. house prices have returned to 2003 levels. 
The patterns in the national aggregates presented in Figures 1 and 2 are also observable when 
looking at state-level cross-sectional data. Figure 3 shows this by way of a scatter plot of the 
change in the stock of foreclosures and the change in the FHFA house price index between 2006 
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and 2008. Clearly, the four so-called sand states (Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada) have 
experienced both the most dramatic home price declines and foreclosure rate increases. 
Foreclosures rise when house prices fall because homeowners begin to see their stock of home 
equity erode. Highly leveraged borrowers, or those with little equity at the time of the house 
price declines, begin sliding into a position of “negative equity,” or owing the lender more than the 
property is worth. CoreLogic estimates that as of year-end 2009, 11.3 million residential properties—
representing 24 percent of all residential properties with mortgages—were in a negative equity 
position. Research has shown that a negative equity position is a necessary condition for mortgage 
default, although a second trigger like a shock to the borrower’s monthly income or expenses is 
generally required for a foreclosure to occur (see, for example, Foote, Gerardi, and Willen 2008). 
The foreclosure process is costly to both borrowers and lenders and perhaps even society as 
a whole. Borrowers incur search costs and moving expenses, face family disruptions, and have 
difficultly accessing credit in the future. Lender costs include the shortfall between the ultimate 
sales price and the mortgage balance and carrying costs (for example, legal, property management, 
and  sales  expenses  and  forgone  interest).  Social  costs  associated  with  foreclosure  may  arise 
from both direct municipal expenses as well as any reduction in the value of nearby properties. 
These costs would seem to be especially acute for vacant properties, which are more likely to 
attract criminal activity (resulting in higher municipal costs) and be in worse physical condition 
(depressing property values). 
Importantly, borrowers and lenders generally have an incentive to prevent the realization of 
private foreclosure costs through debt renegotiation although borrowers’ home equity position 
and cash flow as well as lender incentives shape the renegotiation process. Cordell et al. (2009) 
and Gerardi and Li (2010) provide detailed discussions of the economic issues surrounding 
residential  mortgage  renegotiations,  such  as  forbearance  plans  and  loan  modifications,  and 
identify potential barriers to efficient workouts. The U.S. Treasury’s Home Affordable Modification 
1. Foreclosure is the legal process by which the mortgage lender repossesses a property from the borrower because of 
nonpayment, or default. This process can vary significantly from state to state.
2. Notably, after housing prices began falling and foreclosures rising, the U.S. economy entered a recession, which then 
likely begat additional foreclosures and house price declines.
Figure 1
U.S. mortgage foreclosure rates
Source: Mortgage Bankers Association
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Program (HAMP) is a federal initiative aimed at reducing workout barriers and hence minimizing 
unnecessary foreclosures. 
A less well-known federal program is more squarely focused on reducing the social costs 
associated with foreclosed properties. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) provides grants to state and local authorities to acquire 
land and property, demolish or rehabilitate abandoned properties, and provide down payment or 
closing cost assistance to low- and moderate-income families. The original NSP program (NSP1) 
was authorized by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 and has awarded $4 billion in 
grants to state and local governments. NSP2, which was created by the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, provided an additional $2 billion and established a technical assistance 
program that provides grants to private assistance providers to help municipalities improve their 
use of NSP funds. 
The NSP is predicated on the belief that foreclosures in general and vacancies in particular 
can generate significant social costs in the form of increased municipal expenses and reductions 
in  the  value  of  nearby  properties.  Determining  potential  municipal  expenses  associated  with 
foreclosures and vacancies is largely a survey exercise to tabulate the prices for various public 
services. Apgar and Duda (2005), for example, do this tabulation using information from Chicago. 
By contrast, estimates of the spillover effect of foreclosures on nearby property values require the 
use of multivariate regression techniques. Remarkably, prior to the foreclosure crisis, there had 
been little economic research connecting the incidence of foreclosure to nearby property values.
Foreclosure discounts: Do foreclosed properties sell for less?
If foreclosed residential properties are to have a negative effect on the value of nearby properties, 
they themselves should trade at a discount. Our review of the foreclosure discount literature 
suggests that this is the case although estimates and interpretation vary. 
There are three primary explanations for why a property foreclosure discount should exist: 
(1) systematic differences in property characteristics, (2) lower average property condition or 
quality, and (3) a liquidity discount. A thin empirical literature has generally sought to identify 
any such discount by estimating hedonic (log) sales price regressions that include a foreclosure 
indicator and a large number of control variables representing key property features (for example, 
Figure 2
U.S. home price indexes, non–seasonally adjusted
Note: FHFA U.S. Purchase-Only Home Price, January 1991 = 100; S&P Case-Shiller 20-MSA composite, January 2000 = 100
Source: Standard & Poor’s and Fiserve Inc., Federal Housing Finance Agency
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lot size, the square footage and age of the home, and the number of bedrooms and bathrooms) 
and neighborhood characteristics. Notably, studies vary significantly in their coverage of property 
and neighborhood features—with the latter often simply proxied for using location indicators like 
ZIP code. Nevertheless, if one thought these property and neighborhood characteristics were 
well controlled for, any statistically and economically significant foreclosure discount could then 
presumably be ascribed to differences in property quality or liquidity. Note that, to date, there has 
been only limited investigation seeking to identify these two effects separately. 
Two  early  studies  of  foreclosure  discounts  conditioned  only  on  property  characteristics. 
Shilling, Benjamin, and Sirmans (1990) estimate a 24 percent foreclosure discount for condominium 
sales in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, during 1985, while Forgey, Rutherford, and VanBuskirk (1994) 
similarly report a 23 percent discount for residential sales in Arlington, Texas, between July 1991 
and January 1993. (Note that the coefficient estimates in this latter study are clouded by the fact 
that they attempted to control for neighborhood characteristics using actual ZIP codes rather 
than ZIP code dummies.) Carroll, Clauretie, and Neill (1997) study HUD home sales in Las Vegas 
between 1990 and 1993 and find no statistically significant foreclosure discount after controlling 
for various property characteristics and location using ZIP code indicators. This result is unusual 
relative to the other studies in this literature.
Two more recent studies using hedonic methods examine larger samples and richer sets of 
neighborhood  characteristics.  Sumell  (2009)  estimates  a  50  percent  foreclosure  discount  for 
property sales in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, between 2004 and 2006. Likewise, Campbell, Giglio, 
and  Pathak  (2009)  report  a  22  percent  foreclosure  discount  for  single-family  properties  in 
Massachusetts during 1987–2007. (Note that for this latter study, the hedonic characteristics were 
measured only in 2007.) Unlike these previous studies, Pennington-Cross (2006) uses a repeat- 
sales method that differences out (and hence assumes constant) property and neighborhood 
characteristics. Comparing the change in prices from initial purchase to real estate–owned (REO) 
sale for a nationwide sample of foreclosed homes in relation to their metro area house price index, 
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Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, Federal Housing Finance Agency
3. The author subsequently finds that this discount is positively related to loan size, time in REO, local house price move-
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One plausible explanation for the existence of these (conditional) foreclosure discounts is that 
such homes are, on average, of lower quality. Distressed homeowners are less likely to maintain the 
property in both obvious and nonobvious ways, and this tendency will lead to a lemons discount. Two 
recent studies include indicators of observable subjective quality and find that foreclosed homes 
rated as fair or poor have larger-than-average foreclosure discounts (Clauretie and Daneshvary 
2009; Sumell 2009). While a step in the right direction, controlling for property quality remains a 
significant challenge for this literature.
Related to the quality issue is occupancy status—that is, owner, renter, or vacant. Nonowner-
occupied—and especially vacant—homes that are foreclosed upon are expected to be of lower 
quality. Knight (2002), Anglin, Rutherford, and Springer (2003), and Clauretie and Daneshvary 
(2009) all provide evidence supporting a vacancy discount. (The latter paper also finds evidence 
of a renter discount.) One suggestion here would be to also include interaction terms of occupancy 
status with foreclosure to distinguish an independent effect of occupancy status from the observable 
quality of the property. 
It has also been suggested that the foreclosure discount may be due, in part, to certain sellers 
being willing to accept a lower price in order to sell faster and avoid holding costs (for example, 
property taxes, insurance, and maintenance). Notably, this explanation requires some “limit to 
arbitrage”  opportunities  since  sales  at  below-market  prices  imply  positive  economic  rents  to 
intermediaries of foreclosed properties. Under this “liquidity hypothesis,” one would expect to see 
foreclosed properties have a shorter time on the market. (That said, there is also evidence that 
time on the market also sends a negative signal about quality, so one would need to be careful in 
specifying an empirical model.) 
There may also be a cash discount insofar as this reduces uncertainty about the sale and 
economizes on certain closing costs. Forgey, Rutherford, and VanBuskirk (1994) and Clauretie and 
Daneshvary (2009) both provide some evidence for the existence of cash discounts for home sales. 
However, it’s not clear based on their specifications that this effect is any different for foreclosed 
properties. Again, the use of an interaction effect between cash and foreclosure indicators would 
be helpful.
Clauretie and Daneshvary (2009) report a conditional foreclosure discount of less than 10 
percent after controlling for various property and neighborhood characteristics, property condition 
(quality), occupancy status, time on the market, and cash sales. While this study represents the 
most comprehensive analysis in terms of explaining residential sales prices using hedonic methods, 
the study is limited to data for Clark County, Nevada, between 2004 and 2007. 
Overall, it seems likely that foreclosure discounts exist although the magnitude may vary 
significantly by location and time period. The estimated effects likely reflect a lemons discount, 
with foreclosed properties having lower observable and unobservable quality. It is also possible 
that some of the measured discount is related to the sellers of foreclosed properties being less 
patient than a typical homeowner. Future research should strive to identify the extent to which 
foreclosure discounts separately reflect quality differences or impatient sellers. 
Foreclosure externalities: Do foreclosure discounts affect the value of nearby property? 
Given that foreclosed properties generally sell at a discount, a natural question arises as to whether 
these distressed properties, in turn, put downward sales price pressure on nearby properties, 
resulting in a negative externality. According to Lee (2008), three potential channels by which such 
spillover effects might occur are through poor property maintenance or negligence leading to blight, 
weak property appraisals based on comparables, and an increased supply of available properties for 
sale. Leonard and Murdoch (2009) further suggest that changes in nearby foreclosures foreshadow 
(negative) changes in neighborhood quality, leading to an expectations effect. 
Several recent papers have documented a negative relationship between nondistressed resi- 
dential sales prices and the number of nearby foreclosures using hedonic regressions that control FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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for various property and neighborhood characteristics. (One other study uses the repeat-sales 
method.) The studies also vary along other dimensions: the locations and time periods they evaluate, 
the definitions they use for “nearby” and “foreclosure,” and whether they account for the effect of 
multiple foreclosures.
Immergluck and Smith (2006) relate sales price data for 9,600 single-family properties in 
Chicago sold in 1999 to foreclosures in the two prior years; the study controls for a large number 
of property and neighborhood characteristics. The authors identify the number of foreclosures 
at distances of one-eighth mile (one block) and one-quarter mile (two blocks). The authors find 
that each foreclosure associated with a conventional loan within one-eighth mile is associated 
with a 0.9 percent to 1.1 percent property price decline, depending on whether or not the median 
house price in the census tract is controlled for or not. Foreclosures associated with conventional 
loans located one-eighth to one-quarter mile away from a sale are estimated to have only modest 
spillover effects (0.1 percent to 0.2 percent). Interestingly, foreclosures associated with government-
guaranteed loans appear to have no effect on nearby sales prices. It is not clear why foreclosures 
associated with different types of loans should have differential effects; this difference merits 
further investigation. 
Schuetz, Been, and Ellen (2008) study residential (single- and multifamily) property sales and 
foreclosure notices in New York City between 2000 and 2005. The authors identify properties with 
foreclosure notices nearby nondistressed sales in both physical space (within 250 feet, 250–500 
feet, and 50–1,000 feet) and time (less than and greater than eighteen months). The authors find 
evidence of foreclosure spillover effects although, strangely, these measured effects appear to be 
larger for foreclosures located farther away in both physical space and time. Such nonintuitive 
results suggest that there may be some issues with the empirical specification—for instance, the 
authors control for very few neighborhood characteristics (borough and ZIP code indicators and 
physical distance to subway) and ignore recent house price movements.4 The authors also provide 
some results suggesting that the negative price pressure associated with foreclosure notices is 
larger when there are more of them.
Mikelbank (2008) is the first to empirically separate the spillover effects of foreclosures from 
vacant/abandoned properties, using 2006 property data for Franklin County, Ohio. Intuitively, 
the author finds that the negative effect of vacancies is more severe than foreclosure but is 
concentrated nearby (up to 500 feet), while foreclosure-related effects are modest but persist 
over longer distances (up to 1,000 feet). An important strength of this paper is the ability to 
control somewhat for property quality in terms of condition and construction. The author includes 
limited neighborhood-level control variables (capturing trends in demand for owner-occupied 
housing) but does provide estimates using special econometric techniques designed to account 
for unobserved neighborhood characteristics. Nevertheless, the use of spatial error specification 
techniques has little effect on the estimated effects. 
Leonard and Murdoch (2009) study sales of single-family homes in Dallas County, Texas, during 
2006. Their hedonic price analysis is conditioned on a large number of property and neighborhood 
characteristics, including recent house price trends. The authors delineate nearby foreclosures in 
physical space according to the number located within 250, 500, 1,000, or 1,500 feet of the sale. 
The authors find that properties in some stage of foreclosure depress sales prices and that each 
foreclosure within 250 feet appears to have an effect of about –0.5 percent on sales prices. The 
results suggest that spillover effects may exist at modest levels (–0.1 percent) even farther out in 
physical space although interpretation is difficult given the model specification. 
Rogers and Winter (2009) examine the effect of foreclosures on sales prices of nonforeclosed 
homes in St. Louis County, Missouri, between 1998 and 2007. Foreclosure effects are measured by 
rings that are jointly measured in both physical space (yards between the foreclosure and sale) and 
4. In one specification, the authors include postsale foreclosure notices as an additional neighborhood control.7 E C O N O M I C   R E V I E W   Number 3, 2010
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time (months between the sale and foreclosure). The authors consistently find that foreclosures 
that are physically closer to a sale have negative price effects although (counterintuitively) the 
estimated effects are as strong or stronger two years after foreclosure than six months after 
foreclosure. The authors also find that the marginal impact of foreclosures decline as the number 
of foreclosures increases. One shortcoming of Rogers and Winter’s analysis is the apparent lack of 
temporal control variables. Another weakness is a lack of neighborhood control variables although 
the authors do reestimate their empirical models using spatial generalized methods of moments 
(GMM) techniques that are intended to capture some of these 
effects.  GMM  estimation  yielded  results  qualitatively  similar 
to  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS),  although  quantitatively  the 
measured effects were about one-half, suggesting that the lack 
of neighborhood control variables is an issue. 
Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) explore property sales data 
for the Chicago MSA for 2003 and 2006 and delineate foreclosure spillover effects along physical 
and temporal dimensions. The authors find spillover effects for foreclosures located within ten 
blocks (physical distance) and five years (temporal distance), with a nearby foreclosure in a bad 
year (such as 2006) having a –8.7 percent effect on nearby property values. Foreclosure spillover 
estimates for a good year (such as 2003) are found to be only half as large, thereby illustrating 
the importance of housing cycles. These effects are by far the largest estimated in this nascent 
literature,  likely  owing  to  limited  hedonic  property  characteristics,  the  use  of  only  ZIP  code 
indicators for neighborhood characteristics, and the lack of control for local property price trends. 
Indeed, a literal interpretation of these results would suggest that the externalities may exceed the 
value of the foreclosed property itself.
Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2009) study twenty years of single-family property sales from 
Massachusetts  (although  with  hedonic  property  and  neighborhood  characteristics  measured 
exclusively as of 2007). The authors first estimate the effect of foreclosures on sales prices without 
controlling for either common (unobserved) shocks driving foreclosures and house prices or the 
reverse causality from house prices to foreclosures. This preliminary exercise suggests a 7–9 percent 
foreclosure discount. (This incredible result is consistent with the estimates provided by Lin, 
Rosenblatt, and Yao 2009.) However, using two different “differences-in-differences” approaches 
that aim to net out such confounding effects, the authors more plausibly estimate that foreclosures 
within 0.05 mile lower sales prices by about 1 percent. 
As an alternative to a hedonic regression, Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2009) use a repeat-
sales approach that ostensibly holds the house and neighborhood characteristics constant. The 
authors relate the difference between the sales price of each residential property and the “expected 
price” based on a house price index to nearby foreclosure activity differentiated in physical space 
(0–300  feet,  300–500  feet,  500–1,000  feet,  and  1,000–2,000  feet)  and  time  (the  stage  in  the 
foreclosure process). For a set of seven MSAs, they find that property sales located within 300 feet 
of a foreclosed property experience about a 1 percent discount per foreclosure. (Furthermore, 
the average discount falls to 0.5 percent at a distance of one-eighth mile [the same distance used 
by Immergluck and Smith 2006]). The authors also find that the peak discount occurs at the time 
of the foreclosure sale (before the REO sale); they attribute this peak to property neglect and 
uncertainty relating to the future owners. 
Overall,  the  empirical  evidence  relating  to  foreclosure  effects  on  nearby  property  sales 
prices suggests a discount. Moreover, such discounts likely dissipate quickly the farther away the 
foreclosed property is from the sale in space and time. Hedonic regressions—especially those 
with limited controls for property and neighborhood characteristics—likely suffer from omitted 
variables problems. Repeat-sales approaches may represent an improvement insofar as they do 
not require a rich set of property and neighborhood covariates. The results also highlight the 
importance of controlling for local house-price trends that influence the probability of default by 
The foreclosure process is costly 
to both borrowers and lenders and 
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all mortgage borrowers. (Note that this control is especially important when studying the recent 
experience, which included a large number of borrowers taking extremely leveraged positions just 
prior to a nationwide house price decline.) 
The measured spillover effects of foreclosure are likely due to the condition of the foreclosed 
property. In future research, it would be helpful to control for property quality and/or occupancy 
status since it is widely conjectured that vacant foreclosed properties are of especially low quality 
and attract other social problems. The remaining two other explanations for foreclosure spillovers 
(lowered appraisals as a result of a foreclosure sale being treated as a comparable and an increased 
supply of homes on the local market) have also not been formally investigated. The repeat-sales 
approach seemingly holds more promise than the hedonic approach because it does not require 
a large set of property and neighborhood covariates and can more easily be applied to many 
geographic areas and over longer time periods. However, the repeat-sales approach does require 
a long time series. 
Conclusions
The public sector has responded in various ways to the tremendous rise in mortgage foreclosures 
in recent years. The economic rationale for such interventions rests with the notion that there are 
social costs, or negative externalities, associated with such events. Remarkably, prior to the recent 
foreclosure  crisis,  there  had  been  little  economic  research  documenting  foreclosure  spillover 
effects although the literature has evolved rapidly since.
This critical review of the literature suggests that foreclosed properties sell at a discount, 
likely because such properties are in worse condition. Moreover, very nearby foreclosures appear 
to depress the sales prices of nondistressed properties although this effect decays rapidly in 
physical distance and time. That said, a good deal of variation occurs in estimates, with some being 
implausibly large likely because of poorly specified empirical models. Repeat-sales approaches 
also seem to hold greater promise than hedonic approaches because they are more likely to 
hold property and neighborhood characteristics constant and it is easier to examine multiple 
geographies and longer time periods. 
A literature studying the effect of nearby foreclosures on property values has emerged over 
the past five years. While its results are compelling, it can certainly be improved and expanded. As 
a result, the next five years of research into this topic can be expected to be even more fruitful. 9 E C O N O M I C   R E V I E W   Number 3, 2010
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